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Abstract 
 
In the famous debate between Keynes and Ohlin on the transfer problem, the interaction 
between non-traded goods and unemployment complicates the analysis considerably. We 
analyze these issues using four different models to conclude that Keynes’s concern regarding 
the large burden imposed on Germany was justified. Simultaneously, we show that Ohlin’s 
presumption that a transfer does not affect the donor’s terms-of-trade either favourably or 
unfavourably was also justified. Moreover, Ohlin was also right in asserting that a transfer 
tends to lower the price of non-traded goods for the donor and raise them for the recipient.  
JEL Code: B0, F0, O1. 
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1. Introduction 
The economics of international transfers has repeatedly given rise to interesting 
debates to increase our understanding of the issues involved. The most famous of 
these was the discussion between John Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in 1929 
regarding Germany's capacity to pay reparations after the First World War and the 
terms-of-trade effect, see Keynes (1929a-c) and Ohlin (1929a,b).1 Ever since he wrote 
the Economic Consequences of the Peace in 1919, Germany’s ability to pay 
reparations was on Keynes’s mind.2 The occasion for the famous 1929 debate was a 
new committee of experts under the American Owen Young. The committee had to 
reorganize Germany’s reparation payments of the Dawes plan of 1924, scheduling 
payments of increasing magnitude. In this 1929-debate, Keynes represented a 
classical, partial equilibrium view and argued that a transfer would cause a terms-of-
trade deterioration for the donor. Ohlin, however, pointed at the importance of income 
effects on demand as a result of the transfer to conclude that there was no presumption 
for the terms-of-trade to move either in favor of, or against, the donor.  
 
The focus of the literature soon moved to the welfare effects of a transfer. After 
Leontief (1936) pointed out, by means of an example, the possibility of transfer 
paradoxes (in which the donor gains and/or the recipient loses from the transfer) the 
main point of reference has been Samuelson's (1947) assertion that Leontief's example 
requires instable markets. More specifically, in a perfectly competitive, Walrasian 
stable, two-country world with two traded goods the donor's welfare falls and the 
recipient's welfare rises, see also Kemp (1964) and Mundell (1960). We refer to this 
result (which was hiding in a footnote) as "Samuelson's Theorem."3
 
Samuelson's Theorem does not hold if productive resources are transferred instead of 
purchasing power, if distortions are present in the system, if aid is tied, or if there are 
more than two countries. Transfer paradoxes are thus quite possible in more general 
                                                 
1 Two other debates were the bullionist controversy, regarding the convertibility of gold and payments 
by Great Britain to its allies around 1800, involving e.g. Henry Thornton, David Ricardo and John 
Wheatley, and the debate in 1980-1983 concerning the importance of third parties, involving e.g. 
Graciela Chichilnisky, Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan. 
2 Keynes (1919) calculated that Germany could not possibly pay what the European Allies demanded. 
He thought that Germany could pay a total of £1500m, in thirty annual instalments of £50m. See 
Skidelsky (1992) for details on the evolution of Keynes’s thinking between 1919 and debate of 1929. 
3 See Samuelson (1947, p. 29) and Brakman and Van Marrewijk (1998). 
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settings, see e.g. Jones (1967, 1985), Ohyama (1974), Gale (1974), Chichilnisky 
(1980), Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983), Kemp and Kojima (1985), 
Schweinberger (1990), Kemp (1995), and Kemp and Shimomura (2003). 
 
In their debate Keynes and Ohlin both acknowledged that non-traded goods exist and 
that their presence complicates the analysis considerably. Even more so, if 
unemployment or price rigidities are present. Without either party changing its point 
of view, Keynes and Ohlin focused on the terms-of-trade effect of a transfer in the 
presence of non-traded goods, as did the subsequent literature on the transfer problem 
analyzing non-traded goods, see e.g. McDougall (1965), Samuelson (1971), Chipman 
(1974), and Jones (1975). Yano and Nugent (1999) analyse the small-country case in 
which prices of international goods are given. In this case transfer paradoxes can arise 
if tariffs are introduced as an additional distortion. They show that in practice transfer 
paradoxes are unlikely in these special cases.  
 
This paper presents and investigates the non-traded goods and unemployment 
confusion by analyzing international transfers in a simple, but general, two-country 
dual framework. We focus attention on the welfare effects of a transfer, on the terms-
of-trade effect, and on the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods, a point 
emphasized by Ohlin. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the historical discussion on 
transfers between Keynes and Ohlin. We summarize their positions at the end of 
section 2 in four statements. Section 3 briefly provides the analytic framework of four 
separate models: (i) the standard model, (ii) the non-traded goods model, (iii) the 
unemployment model, and (iv) the complete model. Section 4 derives and discusses 
the analytic consequences of a unilateral transfer in these four models in the light of 
the four assertions made by Keynes and Ohlin identified in section 2. Section 5, 
finally, summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
2. Historical overview 
Discussions on transfers often give rise to confusion and misunderstandings. This also 
holds for the discussion on the effects of transfers in the presence of non-traded 
goods, particularly in conjunction with unemployment. The first example of this 
particular confusion is the famous discussion on transfers between Keynes and Ohlin 
in the Economic Journal in 1929 in which Keynes analyzed the problem of German 
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war reparation payments as a classical economist. In essence this means that the 
current account surplus is the transfer. If this surplus is absent or fails to materialize 
the terms-of-trade (or the exchange rate) deteriorates. If the price-elasticity of exports 
is smaller than one, as Keynes believed to be the case for Germany, a paying country 
is confronted with declining terms-of-trade. If the paying country has to pay 
reparations over a longer period of time, the terms-of-trade will decline from year to 
year. It is important to note that not only Keynes and Ohlin discussed these matters in 
the 1929 volume of the Economic Journal. Most notably Jacques Rueff (1929, p.394) 
added additional concerns to the debate that prelude the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments that was developed later.4 He argued, contrary to Keynes that:  
“the commercial balance has shown a tendency to adjust itself to the necessities of the 
balance of payments, whatever they might be and whatever their origin.”  
After further discussing the history of France, he concludes (p.395): 
“What is remarkable in the case of France after 1870 is that a surplus appeared in the 
commercial balance at precisely the moment when theory would lead one to expect it. 
This only constitutes a presumption – but a very strong presumption – in favour of the 
said theory.” 
 
However, according to Keynes this is not the only problem which faced Germany. 
One of the main problems is that (Keynes, 1929, p. 3): 
"...when foreign borrowing (of Germany) comes to an end, it will be a question, not of 
reducing current consumption in Germany, but of transferring labour from capital works 
in Germany to the export trades....where the outcome of capital improvements ...is not 
in exportable form (and much of it will not be in such a form), the diversion of 
production out of employments into export trades...will have to be on a greater scale 
then is required by the payment of the Reparations alone...". 
Keynes then concludes (p.3) that one of the main problems is not  
"the release to foreign consumers of goods now consumed by Germans, but the 
diversion of German factors of production from other employments into the export 
industries."  
The increase of exports is crucial in Keynes’s thinking. He considered this as “a 
formidable task” and even if efficiency wages are reduced this may not help to increase 
Germany’s exports, or might even make her worse off, in the case (p.5): 
“where the output, e.g. personel services or buildings, cannot be exported anyhow.”  
                                                 
4 The introduction of money requires that time is introduced explicitly – money is only held if it can be 
used to buy commodities tomorrow – this however, does not affect the general conclusions of the 
models described in the next section (see Brakman and Van Marrewijk, 1998, section 10.3). 
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 So, in the eyes of Keynes the existence of non-traded goods very much reduced 
Germany’s capacity to pay. In Keynes's analysis this is a major concern, because 
(relative) prices in the traded goods sector must decrease in order to make the transfer 
possible, making such a diversion of German factors of production into the traded 
goods sector unlikely. Ohlin (1929, p.175), in his comment to Keynes, points out that 
the existence of a non-tradable sector does not alter his main point, namely that 
income effects can make terms-of-trade adjustments redundant in principle.  
 
The presence of non-traded goods complicates the analysis considerably, and certainly 
has not made the discussion between Keynes and Ohlin more transparent. Keynes 
thought that their presence strengthened his case. The consequences of non-traded 
goods for the transfer problem are still problematic, as the latest edition of the best-
selling textbook of Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) shows. They point out that the 
United States spend only a fraction of income on foreign goods, just like Keynes 
pointed this out for Germany in 1929. Obviously, this gives us no information at all 
on the marginal propensities to consume a particular good for Germany or the United 
States.5 Moreover, Krugman and Obstfeld (2006, p. 98) argue: 
"Here the crucial point is that a country's non-traded goods compete with exports for 
resources. A transfer of income from the United States to the rest of the world lowers 
the demand for non-traded goods in the United States, releasing resources that can be 
used to produce U.S. exports. As a result, the supply of U.S. exports rises. .. The result 
is that a transfer by the United States to other countries may lower the price of U.S. 
exports relative to foreign, worsening U.S. terms-of-trade." 
 
They then conclude on the basis of this reasoning that "Keynes was right in practice." 
However, the above quote suffers from two omissions. First, resources released from 
the production of non-traded goods in the U.S. could also be used for the production 
of goods otherwise imported. Second, and more importantly, the transfer to the rest of 
the world has increased the demand for U.S. exports, as stressed time and again by 
Ohlin. Indeed, Ohlin argues that (1929a, p. 174): 
                                                 
5 Suppose, for example, that there are two countries with an income level of 100, each spending 50 on 
traded good x and 50 on traded good y, while one country produces (in value terms) 60 of x and 40 of y 
and the other 40 of x and 60 of y. Then the observation that both countries only spend 10 percent on 
foreign goods says nothing about the average propensities to consume, let alone the marginal 
propensities to consume. 
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"Home market prices tend to rise in A [that is: the recipient] and fall in B [that is: the 
donor], relative to prices of export and import goods and prices of the goods which 
compete with import goods. .. It is not necessary that A's export prices should rise and 
B's fall. Thus, B need not offer its goods on cheaper terms-of-trade to induce A to take 
a greater quantity of them. Indirectly, however, it is probable that a certain shift of the 
terms of exchange will take place." 
So, he notes that in the presence of non-traded goods price changes might happen but 
that these are not necessary, as Keynes believed. Ohlin (1929, p.175) concludes :  
“This erroneous conclusion is reached because of the fact that the shift in buying power 
is ignored, except in so far as it directly affects demand for international goods.” 
 
To be fair to Keynes we also deal with the possibility of unemployment and rigidity.6 
As Keynes (1929a, p. 6) stresses, and what is also forcefully put forward by Rueff 
who cites Keynes (1929, p. 390):  
“In the case of German reparations, we are trying to fix the volume of foreign 
remittances and compel the balance of trade to adjust itself thereto. Those who see no 
difficulty in this…are applying the theory of liquids to what is, if not a solid, at least a 
sticky mass with strong internal resistances.” 
 
To settle the issue of the terms-of-trade effect of an international transfer and its 
relation to non-traded goods we first need to extend Samuelson's result on the welfare 
effects of a transfer to non-traded goods. Furthermore, we allow for the possibility of 
unemployment and rigidity. At this point it is fair to point out that Keynes was not the 
ignoramus as he is sometimes portrayed to be in this debate (Keynes, 1929a, p.2): 
"If 1 pound is taken from you and given to me and I choose to increase my 
consumption of precisely the same goods as those of which you are compelled to 
diminish yours, there is no Transfer problem." 
However, he thought that this was only a special case. Keynes was very much a 
practical man in this discussion and he was convinced that Germany could never pay 
the total of war reparations.  
 
For Keynes this was not the first time he was worried about the possibilities of 
Germany to pay war reparations, as is illustrated in his The Economic Consequences 
of the Peace (1919). In the transfer debate of 1929 he was uneasy that the debate 
became more and more theoretical instead of practical (Keynes, 1929c, p. 404): "the 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to one of the anonymous referees for drawing our attention to Rueff (1929). 
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controversy...moves quite inevitably, from the particular (that is, Germany) to the general." 
From a practical point view he turned out to be right; Germany could never pay the 
huge amount it should pay and the fact that it was forced to do so helped to pave the 
way for Hitler. As Kershaw (1999, p. 355) notes: 
"With the Brüning government under siege, ruling by emergency decree, its  
policies - calculated to demonstrate Germany's inability to pay  
reparations - sending the economy plummeting  to disaster  in a  
catastrophic downward  spiral of cascading production levels and soaring  
levels of unemployment and social mysery, more and more voters were  
cursing the wretched Republic [the Weimar republic].” 
 
Our analysis below is general. The analysis simplifies, however, if we make the 
standard assumption in international economics of an identical demand structure.7 For 
ease of reference, we label this assumption 1. 
 Assumption 1. Donor and recipient have an identical demand structure: BuAu mm =  
 
Moreover, we summarize the assertions made by Keynes and Ohlin as discussed 
above in four statements:  
 Keynes’s concern: transfers impose a (large) burden on the donor; this holds 
particularly for Germany in the presence of non-traded goods and price rigidities. 
 Keynes’s presumption: a transfer deteriorates the donor’s terms-of-trade, 
specifically in the presence of non-traded goods. 
 Ohlin’s presumption I: there is no reason for a transfer to affect the donor’s terms-
of-trade either favourably or unfavourably.  
 Ohlin’s presumption II: the price of non-traded relative to traded goods will rise 
for the recipient and fall for the donor. 8 
 
                                                 
7 See, for example, p.6 in Bowen, et al. (1998). 
8 It is interesting to note that Harry Johnson concurred with this presumption. In the final section of 
Johnson (1976) he notes that additional income for the recipient increases the demand for non-traded 
goods, which (initially) leads to price increases of non-tradables. He argues that the subsequent 
substitution process can be in the direction of importables or exportables, but “since there is no reason 
to assume that the effect is biased one way or the other, p.219” the introduction of non-tradables has no 
bearing on the discussion. In the sections below we show the importance of Ohlin’s second 
presumption in the debate.  
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3. The models9
We analyze international transfers under four different settings of perfect competition 
if there are two countries (donor A and recipient B) and two traded goods (numéraire 
good x and good y with price p). The settings are referred to as (i) the standard model 
(no unemployment or non-traded goods), (ii) the non-traded goods model (with a non-
traded good for both donor and recipient), (iii) the unemployment model (with 
unemployment in the donor country), and the complete model (with both non-traded 
goods and donor unemployment). We let BAJ ,=  be the country index,  is the 
price of the locally provided non-traded good, 
Jq
JE  is the expenditure function, JR  is 
the revenue function, T is the transfer from country A to country B,  is the welfare 
level,  is employment in country 
Ju
Av A ,  is the real wage in country A, and  is 
the net demand for good y, i.e. , where subscripts refer to derivatives.
Aw Jm
J
p
J
p
J REm −= 10 
The equations below are used to construct the various models mentioned above.  
(1) TvqpRuqpE AAAAAA −= ),,(),,(  
(2)  ),,(),,( AAAq
AAA
q vqpRuqpE =
(3)  AAAAv wvqpR =),,(
(4) TqpRuqpE BBBBB += ),(),,(  
(5)  ),(),,( BBq
BBB
q qpRuqpE =
(6)  0),,(),,,( =+ BBBAAAA uqpmvuqpm
 
Equation (1) is the donor's budget constraint. It indicates that total expenditure AE , 
which is a function of the prices  and  and the attained welfare level , is equal 
to total revenue 
p Aq Au
AR , which is a function of the prices  and and the employment 
level , after subtracting the transfer to country B (measured in terms of good x). 
Similarly, equation (4) is the recipient’s budget constraint. As we do not analyze 
unemployment for the recipient, the argument  is suppressed. Equation (2) is the 
donor’s market clearing condition for non-traded goods. Making use of the derivative 
properties of expenditure and revenue functions, domestic demand  must be equal 
p Aq
Av
Bv
A
qE
                                                 
9 Detailed derivations can be found in the appendix. 
10 Note, that the model assumes non-satiable wants. The case of satiable wants in the context of 
transfers was analyzed by Johnson (1976).  
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to domestic supply . Similarly, equation (5) is the recipient’s market clearing 
condition for non-traded goods, where the argument  is again suppressed. If we 
analyze unemployment in the donor country, we will always assume that the sticky 
real wage rate  is a binding restriction, such that actual employment  is 
endogenously (demand) determined, see equation (3). Finally, using again the 
derivative properties, equation (5) is the market clearing condition for traded good y. 
The four models mentioned above can now be summarized as follows. 
A
qR
Bv
Aw Av
 The standard model ignores non-traded goods and unemployment; it consists of 
equations (1), (4), and (6), with the endogenous variables , and .  Aup, Bu
 The non-traded goods model ignores unemployment; it consists of equations (1), 
(2), (4), (5), and (6), with the endogenous variables , and . ABA uqqp ,,, Bu
 The unemployment model ignores non-traded goods; it consists of equations (1), 
(3), (4), and (6), with the endogenous variables , and . AA uvp ,, Bu
 The complete model incorporates non-traded goods and unemployment; it consists 
of equations (1)-(6), with the endogenous variables , and . AABA uvqqp ,,,, Bu
 
For the models incorporating non-traded goods, we will simplify the analysis by 
eliminating equations (2) and (5), which can be solved for the price of non-traded 
goods  for donor and recipient as a function of the price Jq p  of good y, employment 
, and domestic welfare : Av Ju
(7)  withupqqvupqq BBBAAAA ),,(;),,( ==
BAJ
RE
E
q
RE
RE
q
RE
R
q J
qq
J
qq
J
quJ
uJ
qq
J
qq
J
qp
J
qpJ
pA
qq
A
qq
A
qvA
v ,,)(
,
)(
)(
;
)(
=−−=−
−−=−=  
Note that if there is any substitution at all in either production or consumption of the 
non-traded good in country J, then equation (7) is well defined for that country (that is 
), as we henceforth assume. Also note that if the traded good y and the 
non-traded good are net substitutes (that is ), then  is positive, while 
if the non-traded good is a normal good (that is ), then  is also positive. 
0<− JqqJqq RE
0>− JqpJqp RE Jpq
0>JquE Juq
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4. The results 
For each of the models introduced in section 3 we now briefly provide and discuss the 
main analytic results, identified by sub-indices st, nt, un, and co for the standard, non-
traded goods, unemployment, and complete model, respectively.  
 
4.1. The standard model 
The basic economic implications of international transfers are most easily understood 
by restricting attention to the standard model, that is by allowing for two traded 
goods, two countries, perfect competition, and no imperfections. We normalize such 
that  and define Ω  and ∆  for notational convenience as follows:  1=JuE
(8) ;  0<≡Ω ∑J Jpm 0)(/1 <−≡∆− ∑J JuJJp mmm  
The term  is always non-positive as it is the derivative of the compensated net 
demand for good y with respect to its own price p. If there is some substitutability in 
either demand or supply (or both) between good y and good x, the term will be strictly 
negative, as we henceforth assume. The positively defined term 
Ω
∆  is associated with 
Walrasian stability, based on a dynamic adjustment process where the price falls 
(rises) if it is higher (lower) than the equilibrium price, see Brakman and van 
Marrewijk (1998, pp. 39 – 41) for details. Differentiating equations (1), (4), and (6) 
with respect to  and T, solving these equations, and imposing Walrasian 
stability gives the following the terms-of-trade and welfare effects: 
BA uup ,,
(9) Au
B
u
A
u
B
u
st
mmmm
dT
dp >⇔>∆−= 0)(  
(10) 0;0;0 =+>∆Ω−=<∆Ω=
st
B
st
A
st
B
st
A
dT
du
dT
du
dT
du
dT
du  
 
Equation (9) indicates that the price of good y will rise, if and only if , that is 
if the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume good y is higher than the donor’s 
propensity to consume this good. Obviously, there is no terms-of-trade effect if the 
demand structure is identical (Assumption 1). Even if there are demand differences, 
however, the donor may either export or import good y, so there is no presumption 
that the terms-of-trade will move against the donor. Equation (10) indicates that the 
transfer indeed imposes a burden on the donor as its welfare decreases. Similarly, the 
A
u
B
u mm >
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transfer is welcomed by the recipient, whose welfare increases. Finally, as there are 
no imperfections in the standard model, there is no room for Pareto improvements.  
 
Result 1. In the standard model: Keynes’s concern is valid (donor burden), as is 
Ohlin’s presumption I (neutral terms-of-trade effect) 
 
4.2. The non-traded goods model 
One of the central points in section 2 is that the discussion between Keynes and Ohlin 
was complicated by the presence of non-traded goods. The non-traded goods model 
provided in section 3 is used to analyze these issues. It is convenient to define 
analogous terms as in the standard model: 
(8’) purqmmm Jr
J
q
J
r
J
r ,, =+≡ ;  ∑≡Ω J Jpm ; 
 0)(/1 <−≡∆− ∑J JuJJp mmm  
The inequality in the last term of equation (8’) is again based on Walrasian stability. 
All the definitions take the non-traded goods effects into consideration. Take, for 
example, the term Au
A
q
A
u
A
u qmmm += . It consists of the sum of  and . The 
former is the regular marginal propensity to consume good y, while the latter is the 
indirect effect on this marginal propensity through the non-traded goods sector. If 
good y and the non-traded good are substitutes, the term  is positive. If the non-
traded good is a normal good, the term  is positive, see section 3. Under those 
circumstances, then, the total marginal propensity to consume good y is positive if the 
direct effect dominates the indirect effect, see also below.  
A
um
A
u
A
q qm
A
qm
A
uq
 
For analytic purposes, it is important to sign the term Ω . From the definition of Ω  
and equation (7) it follows that 
(11) 
( )∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=Ω J JqqJqq
J
qJ
p RE
m
m
)(
2
 
Thus, using the definition of  in (11), a sufficient condition for Jm Ω  to be negative 
is for each term in the summation in (11) to be negative, that is 
(12) 
( )
BAJfor
RE
RE
RE J
qq
J
qq
J
pq
J
pqJ
pp
J
pp ,0)(
2
=<−
−−−  
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Since the net expenditure function JJ RE −  is concave in prices both conditions in 
(12) are satisfied. 11 The term Ω  is therefore unambiguously negative. Differentiating 
equations (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6), with respect to , and , solving 
the equations, and imposing Walrasian stability gives: 
BABA uuqqp ,,,, T
(9’) Au
B
u
A
u
B
u
nt
mmmm
dT
dp >⇔>∆−= 0)(  
(10’) 0;0;0 =+>∆Ω−=<∆Ω=
nt
B
nt
A
nt
B
nt
A
dT
du
dT
du
dT
du
dT
du  
 
Equation (9’) indicates that the price of good y will rise, if and only if Au
B
u mm > , that 
is if the recipient’s direct plus indirect marginal propensity to consume good y is 
higher than the donor’s direct plus indirect propensity to consume this good. Again, 
there is no terms-of-trade effect if the demand structure is identical (Assumption 1) 
and even if there are demand differences, the donor may either export or import good 
y, so there is no presumption that the terms-of-trade will move against the donor. 
Equation (10’) indicates that the transfer also imposes a burden on the donor in a non-
traded goods setting (as its welfare decreases) and is welcomed by the recipient (as its 
welfare increases). Since the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation both internationally (between traded goods) and domestically 
(between traded and non-traded goods), Pareto improvements are again not possible.  
 
What about relative prices? Keynes was convinced that a major aspect of the transfer 
problem was to divert factors of production from the non-traded to the traded goods 
sector. This problem becomes more important if relative prices of traded versus non-
traded goods decline. Suppose, then, that there is no terms-of-trade effect as a result of 
the transfer. How about the price of non-traded goods? From (7) it follows that 
(13) 
nt
J
p
nt
J
J
u
nt
J
dT
dpq
dT
duq
dT
q +=  
                                                 
11 The matrix of second-order price derivatives is negative semi-definite, such that 
. This, in conjunction with ( )( ) ( ) 02 >−−−− JpqJpqJqqJqqJppJpp RERERE ( ) 0<− JqqJqq RE , gives (12).  
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Thus, if 0/ =
nt
dTdp  we can conclude for the recipient that the sign of 
nt
B dTdq /  is 
the same as the sign of  (since Buq nt
B dTdu /  is positive, see equation (10’)), which in 
turn is the same as the sign of , see (7). Therefore, the recipient's price of non-
traded goods rises if, and only if, the marginal propensity to consume non-traded 
goods is positive. Similar reasoning with a reverse effect holds for the donor of the 
transfer, which therefore experiences a fall in the price of non-traded goods. Even if 
the price p of traded good y changes, it is obvious from equation (13) that the above 
conclusions on the changes in the price of non-traded relative to traded goods for 
donor and recipient still holds if we construct a price index of traded goods in which 
the weight given to good y equals  (this weight is positive if non-traded goods and 
good y are net substitutes).
B
quE
J
pq
12 To summarize the above discussion: 
 
Result 2. In the non-traded goods model: Keynes’s concern is valid (donor burden), 
as is Ohlin’s presumption I (neutral terms-of-trade effect) and Ohlin’s presumption II 
(the price of non-traded goods rises for the recipient and falls for the donor) 
 
4.3 The unemployment model 
As discussed in section 2, Keynes’s concern regarding Germany’s ability to pay for 
the imposed international transfers was partially based on a potential exacerbation of 
Germany’s high unemployment rate at the time of the debate. In effect, the transfer 
may shift resources into or out of the unproductive ‘unemployment’ sector, see 
Bhaduri and Skarstein (1996). Before turning to the interaction between non-traded 
goods and unemployment, we first analyze the model of sticky-wage unemployment 
outlined in section 3 in the absence of non-traded goods, see also Berthélemy (1988) 
and Beladi (1990). It is convenient to define: 
(8”)  ; )/()/()/( Av
A
pv
AAA RpRwppw =∂∂≡ε
0)/()/()/( >−=∂∂−≡η AvAvvAAA RvRwvvw ; 
  0))(/(/1~/1 2 <−+∆−≡∆− AAuAAA pmpvw εηε
 
                                                 
12 See also McDougall (1965), who uses a Divisia price index for traded goods. 
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The terms  and  are two elasticities, where  is the donor’s Stolper-Samuelson 
factor price elasticity for good y. In a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model,  will be 
larger than 1 if good y uses factor v (labor in this case) intensively and negative if 
good x uses factor v intensively. Alternatively,  will be positive but smaller than 1 
in a Ricardo-Viner model, see Dixit and Norman (1980). The positively defined 
elasticity  indicates how quickly the real wage rate falls if employment rises. The 
last inequality is again based on Walrasian stability. Differentiating equations (1), (3), 
(4), and (6), with respect to , and T , solving the equations, and imposing 
Walrasian stability gives: 
Aε Aη Aε
Aε
Aε
Aη
BAA uuvp ,,,
(9”) Au
B
u
A
u
B
u
un
mmmm
dT
dp >⇔>∆−= 0~)(  
(10”) 
un
B
un
B
un
A
A
un
A
un
A
dT
dpm
dT
du
dT
dvw
dT
dpm
dT
du −=+−−= 1;1  
un
A
AA
A
un
A
A
un
B
un
A
dT
dp
p
vw
dT
dvw
dT
du
dT
du ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
η
ε==+  
 
The first thing to note from equation (9”) is that the price of good y rises, if and only 
if , that is if the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume good y is higher 
than the donor’s propensity to consume this good, just like in the standard model. Our 
conclusions regarding the terms-of-trade effect are therefore not affected by 
incorporating unemployment in the model. The welfare effects, however, are less 
clear cut. Since unemployment represents a distortion in the model, neither the 
donor’s nor the recipient’s welfare effect can be signed in general. For that reason, 
equation (10”) is written to identify the main welfare effects. The recipient is 
confronted with a positive direct welfare effect from receipt of the transfer (the term 1 
in equation (10”)) and a terms-of-trade effect (the term 
A
u
B
u mm >
)/(
un
B dTdpm−  in equation 
(10”)), which is positive if the price of the recipient’s export good rises. The donor is 
confronted with a similar terms-of-trade effect and a negative direct transfer effect. In 
addition, the donor faces an employment effect (the term )/(
un
AA dTdvw  in equation 
(10”)), which is positive if total employment rises. If the latter is the case, the transfer 
causes a positive total welfare effect. In theory, this employment effect can be so large 
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that a Pareto improvement is possible (welfare increase for both donor and recipient). 
The employment effect, however, may also work in the opposite direction, by 
reducing total welfare and making the donor even worse off, which was one of 
Keynes’s concerns (in which case there could be a welfare decrease for both donor 
and recipient). Note, however, that under identical demand conditions (assumption 1) 
none of this is relevant. In that case, both the terms-of-trade effect and the 
employment effect are zero. This leads to: 
 
Result 3. In the unemployment model: Keynes’s concern is valid (donor burden), as is 
Ohlin’s presumption I (neutral terms-of-trade effect).  
 
4.4. The complete model 
The effect of international transfers in the presence of non-traded goods and 
unemployment can be analyzed in the complete model. The analysis in the preceding 
sections is useful for understanding the main effects of the complete model, 
particularly under assumption 1. As we did when moving from the standard to the 
non-traded goods model (from section 4.1 to section 4.2), we define analogous terms 
incorporating the direct and indirect (non-traded goods) effects when moving from the 
unemployment model to the complete model (from section 4.3 to this section), see 
equation (8#). In this case, however, there is an additional complication, arising from 
the interaction between non-traded goods and unemployment. This can be most easily 
understood by looking at equation (3): . AAAAv wvqpR =),,(
 In the absence of non-traded goods, this reduces to , implying that 
any changes in employment are caused exclusively by changes in the terms-of-
trade. Under assumption 1, there are no changes in the terms-of-trade, and hence 
no employment effects (see section 4.3).   
AAA
v wvpR =),(
 If there are non-traded goods, however, changes in employment can be caused 
either by changes in the terms-of-trade p or by changes in the price of non-traded 
goods q. Now recall from the non-traded goods section 4.2 that even if there is no 
change in the terms-of-trade (assumption 1), there still is a change in the price of 
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non-traded goods. In the complete model, then, this change in the price of non-
traded goods will affect employment, and hence indirectly the terms-of-trade.13 
 
(8#) )( Av
A
q
A
v
A
v qmmm += ; vuprqRRR ArAvqAvrAvr ,,,)( =+≡  
0/))(()/1)(/1(ˆ/1 <+−+∆−+≡∆− AvvAvAuAAvpAvuAAvvAvuA RmmwRRmRRw   
 
The inequality denotes Walrasian stability.14 Differentiating equations (1)-(7) with 
respect to , and BAABA uuvqqp ,,,,, T , and solving the equations gives: 
(9#) [ ] ∆++−= ˆ))(/()( AvAuAAvvAvuAuBu
co
mmwRRmm
dT
dp  
(10#) 
co
B
co
B
co
A
A
co
A
co
A
dT
dpm
dT
du
dT
dvw
dT
dpm
dT
du −=+−−= 1;1  
[ ] )/ˆ()/()( AvvAvuAuBuA
co
A
A
co
B
co
A
RRmmw
dT
dvw
dT
du
dT
du ∆∆−−==+   
It is evident from equation (9#) that even with an identical demand structure 
(assumption 1) there will be a change in the terms-of-trade caused by the indirect 
effect of the change in the price of non-traded goods, as outlined above. In general, as 
in the case of the unemployment model, no definite conclusions regarding the welfare 
effects can be drawn. As a result of the interaction between non-traded goods and 
unemployment, this even holds under an identical demand structure.15 We can, 
however, draw conclusions on the employment effects under assumption 1, and hence 
on the total welfare effect. From the last equation in (10#) it is clear that the 
employment effect depends crucially on the sign of Avv
A
vu RR /  since ∆  and  are 
positive. Assuming that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, we know that 
∆ˆ
0<AvvR . From the definition, it follows that AuAvqAuAvqAvuAvu qRqRRR =+≡ )( . If non-traded 
goods are normal goods . Finally, we know that depending on the labour 0>Auq
                                                 
13 This result is exactly what Ohlin (1929a, p. 174) had in mind “…It is not necessary that A's export 
prices should rise and B's fall. Thus, B need not offer its goods on cheaper terms-of-trade to induce A to 
take a greater quantity of them. Indirectly, however, it is probable that a certain shift of the terms of 
exchange will take place." 
14 Note that we could define elasticities analogous to those of section 4.3 on the basis of AvrR . 
15 We do not think it is very likely that the indirect effect is large enough to cause a welfare paradox 
(donor enrichment or recipient impoverishment), but we are unable to rule this out analytically.  
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intensity of non-traded goods  can be positive or negative (see the discussion with 
respect to equation 8”). In a Ricardo-Viner model, which reflects Keynes’s world of 
rigidities better than the neo-classical world, , and hence 
A
vqR
0>AvqR 0>AvuR . Under 
assumption 1, therefore, the employment effect is positive. The transfer tends to 
alleviate the distortion imposed on the donor economy, and thereby mitigates the 
negative welfare effect imposed on the donor, weakening Keynes’s concern.  
 
Result 4. In the complete model: Keynes’s concern is weakened (donor burden) and 
Ohlin’s presumption I (neutral terms-of-trade effect) is valid.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Keynes’s concern regarding the economic burden imposed on Germany after World 
War I with respect to the reparations payments can be based on four effects: 
A. The direct burden of the transfer, indicating that Germany had to give up real 
resources that could have been used for its own consumption and reconstruction. 
B. The indirect burden of a transfer through a deteriorating terms-of-trade. 
C. The indirect burden of a transfer through rising unemployment. 
D. The indirect burden of a transfer through a change in the price of non-traded 
goods, which may exacerbate the unemployment problem.  
 
We analyze these concerns using four different settings incorporating non-traded 
goods and unemployment, as summarized in Table 1. On the basis of assumption 1, 
we now briefly relate these results to the Keynes – Ohlin debate (as reviewed in 
section 2). See the main text, however, for details of the analysis. From a practical 
point of view, Keynes’s concern regarding the burden imposed on Germany certainly 
seems to be valid. The donor is worse off and the recipient is better off in the standard 
model, the non-traded goods model, and the unemployment model. Since the 
interaction between non-traded goods and unemployment in the complete model in 
general leads to a reduction of unemployment, thus mitigating this distortion, 
Keynes’s concern is weakened in the complete model.  
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 Table 1 Summary of results for the four models 
1.a Summary of effects under assumption 1 
 type of model 
 standard non-traded unemployment complete 
donor terms-of-trade 0 0 0 ? 
donor welfare - - - ? 
recipient welfare + + + ? 
donor price non-traded goods n.a. - * n.a. ? 
recipient price non-traded goods n.a. + * n.a. ? 
donor employment n.a. n.a. 0 + **
1.b Summary of results under regular supply and demand conditions 
Keynes’s concern valid valid valid weakened
Keynes’s presumption not valid not valid not valid not valid 
Ohlin’s presumption I valid valid valid valid 
Ohlin’s presumption II n.a. valid n.a. unclear 
n.a. = not applicable; 
* if non-traded goods are normal ( ); 0>Juq ** if non-traded goods are normal and 0>AvqR  
 
In the presence of non-traded goods, Ohlin’s presumption II, that the price of non-
traded relative to traded goods will rise for the recipient and fall for the donor, is also 
valid. It is readily understood from the fact that, other things equal, the transfer 
increases demand for non-traded goods for the recipient and reduces demand for the 
donor. Although this force is also operative in the complete model, no clear 
conclusions can be drawn in this setting because both the terms-of-trade and the 
employment level will change, and both these changes will also affect the price of 
non-traded goods relative to traded goods.  
 
Ohlin’s presumption I, that there is no reason for a transfer to affect the donor’s 
terms-of-trade either favourably or unfavourably is valid under all circumstances. This 
implies, simultaneously, that Keynes’s presumption that a transfer worsens the 
donor’s terms-of-trade is not valid. In most cases, a terms-of-trade change is not 
necessary at all in response to an international transfer because the recipient’s increase 
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in demand is offset by the donor’s decrease in demand. Only in the complete model is 
a change in the terms-of-trade necessary; this follows from the fact that, in the 
absence of any other changes, the reduction in the donor’s demand for non-traded 
goods causes a price change for non-traded goods, starting off a series of indirect 
price effects through the production and demand structure.  
 
Finally, it is clear from the top part of Table 1 that the most important economic 
effects of an international transfer cannot be unambiguously signed in the complete 
model, incorporating both non-traded goods and unemployment. This makes the 
largely unresolved Keynes – Ohlin discussion understandable. Our analysis discusses 
not only the most important economic consequences in a framework of non-traded 
goods and a framework of unemployment, but also how the interaction between these 
two phenomena complicate the analysis in the complete model. In short, it shows the 
value of analytic model building in guiding the discussion and our understanding. 
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Appendix:  Transfers, non-traded goods, and unemployment 
This appendix briefly derives the main results for the four models. The equation 
numbers refer to the equivalent numbers in the paper. 
 
1. Standard model 
(1) TpRupE AAA −= )(),(  
(4) TpRupE BBB += )(),(  
(6)  0),(),( =+ BBAA upmupm
Normalize  and define 1=JuE 0<≡Ω ∑J Jpm  and . 
Differentiate with respect to  and T and solve: 
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2. Non-traded goods model 
(1) TqpRuqpE AAAAA −= ),(),,(  
(2)  ),(),,( AAq
AAA
q qpRuqpE =
(4) TqpRuqpE BBBBB += ),(),,(  
(5)  ),(),,( BBq
BBB
q qpRuqpE =
(6)  0),,(),,( =+ BBBAAA uqpmuqpm
Solve (2) and (5) for the price of non-traded goods and substitute in (1), (4), and (6): 
(1) TupqpRuupqpE AAAAAAA −= )),(,()),,(,(  
(4) TupqpRuupqpE BBBBBBB += )),(,()),,(,(  
(6)  0)),,(,()),,(,( =+ BABBAAAA uupqpmuupqpm
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3. Unemployment model 
(1) TvpRupE AAAA −= ),(),(  
(3)  AAAv wvpR =),(
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4. Complete model 
(1) TvqpRuqpE AAAAAA −= ),,(),,(  
(2)  ),,(),,( AAAq
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(3)  AAAAv wvqpR =),,(
(4) TqpRuqpE BBBBB += ),(),,(  
(5)  ),(),,( BBq
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q qpRuqpE =
(6)  0),,(),,,( =+ BBBAAAA uqpmvuqpm
Solve (2) and (5) for the price of non-traded goods; substitute in (1), (3), (4), and (6): 
(1) TvupqpRuvupqpE AAAAAAAAA −= )),,(,()),,,(,(  
(3)  AAAAAAv wvvupqpR =)),,,(,(
(4) TupqpRuupqpE BBBBBBB += )),(,()),,(,(  
(6)  0)),,(,()),,(,( =+ BABBAAAA uupqpmuupqpm
)/( Aqq
A
qq
A
qv
A
v RERq −≡ ; )( AvAqAvAv qmmm += ; )( AvAvqApvApv qRRR +≡ ; )( AvAvqAvvAvv qRRR +≡ ; 
A
u
A
vq
A
vu qRR ≡ ; 0/))(()/1)(/1(ˆ/1 <+−+∆−+≡∆− AvvAvAuAAvpAvuAAvvAvuA RmmwRRmRRw . 
Differentiate with respect to  and T and solve: ABA vuup ,,,
dT
dv
du
du
dp
RRR
mmm
m
wm
A
B
A
A
vv
A
vu
A
vp
A
v
B
u
A
u
B
A
A
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡−
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
Ω
−
0
0
1
1
0
010
01
 
[ ] ∆++−= ˆ))(/()(/ AvAuAAvvAvuAuBu mmwRRmmdTdp  
dT
dpm
dT
du
dT
dvw
dT
dpm
dT
du BBAAAA −=+−−= 1;1  
dT
dvw
dT
du
dT
du AABA =+  
[ ] )/ˆ()/()( AvvAvuAuBuA RRmmdTdv ∆∆−−=  
 
 
 
 23
CESifo Working Paper Series 
(for full list see www.cesifo-group.de)
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1525 Alexander Kemnitz, Can Immigrant Employment Alleviate the Demographic Burden? 
The Role of Union Centralization, August 2005 
 
1526 Baoline Chen and Peter A. Zadrozny, Estimated U.S. Manufacturing Production Capital 
and Technology Based on an Estimated Dynamic Economic Model, August 2005 
 
1527 Marcel Gérard, Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under 
Alternative Tax Designs, August 2005 
 
1528 Joerg Breitscheidel and Hans Gersbach, Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms, 
August 2005 
 
1529 Giorgio Fazio, Ronald MacDonald and Jacques Mélitz, Trade Costs, Trade Balances 
and Current Accounts: An Application of Gravity to Multilateral Trade, August 2005 
 
1530 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, A Micro-Level ‘Consumer 
Approach’ to Species Population Dynamics, August 2005 
 
1531 Samuel Hanson, M. Hashem Pesaran and Til Schuermann, Firm Heterogeneity and 
Credit Risk Diversification, August 2005 
 
1532 Mark Mink and Jakob de Haan, Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political 
Budget Cycles in the European Union?, September 2005 
 
1533 Roberta Colavecchio, Declan Curran and Michael Funke, Drifting Together or Falling 
Apart? The Empirics of Regional Economic Growth in Post-Unification Germany, 
September 2005 
 
1534 Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas, Succession Rules and Leadership Rents, 
September 2005 
 
1535 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, The Desire for Impact, September 2005 
 
1536 Wolfgang Buchholz and Wolfgang Peters, Justifying the Lindahl Solution as an 
Outcome of Fair Cooperation, September 2005 
 
1537 Pieter A. Gautier, Coen N. Teulings and Aico van Vuuren, On-the-Job Search and 
Sorting, September 2005 
 
1538 Leif Danziger, Output Effects of Inflation with Fixed Price- and Quantity-Adjustment 
Costs, September 2005 
 
1539 Gerhard Glomm, Juergen Jung, Changmin Lee and Chung Tran, Public Pensions and 
Capital Accumulation: The Case of Brazil, September 2005 
 
 
1540 Yvonne Adema, Lex Meijdam and Harrie A. A. Verbon, The International Spillover 
Effects of Pension Reform, September 2005 
 
1541 Richard Disney, Household Saving Rates and the Design of Social Security 
Programmes: Evidence from a Country Panel, September 2005 
 
1542 David Dorn and Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced 
Decision?, September 2005 
 
1543 Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini, Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and 
Optimal Board Structure, September 2005 
 
1544 Panu Poutvaara, Social Security Incentives, Human Capital Investment and Mobility of 
Labor, September 2005 
 
1545 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume, Can Deunionization Lead 
to International Outsourcing?, September 2005 
 
1546 Robert Inklaar, Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob de Haan, Trade and Business Cycle 
Synchronization in OECD Countries: A Re-examination, September 2005 
 
1547 Randall K. Filer and Marjorie Honig, Endogenous Pensions and Retirement Behavior, 
September 2005 
 
1548 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann and Bjoern-Jakob Treutler, Global Business 
Cycles and Credit Risk, September 2005 
 
1549 Ruediger Pethig, Nonlinear Production, Abatement, Pollution and Materials Balance 
Reconsidered, September 2005 
 
1550 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, Turkish Delight for Some, Cold Turkey for 
Others?: The Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, September 2005 
 
1551 Peter Birch Sørensen, Dual Income Taxation: Why and how?, September 2005 
 
1552 Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume, Gatekeeping in Health Care, 
September 2005 
 
1553 Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, Looking for 
Multiple Equilibria when Geography Matters: German City Growth and the WWII 
Shock, September 2005 
 
1554 Paul W. J. de Bijl, Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets, 
September 2005 
 
1555 Ueli Grob and Stefan C. Wolter, Demographic Change and Public Education Spending: 
A Conflict between Young and Old?, October 2005 
 
1556 Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?, October 
2005 
 
1557 Piotr Wdowinski, Financial Markets and Economic Growth in Poland: Simulations with 
an Econometric Model, October 2005 
 
1558 Peter Egger, Mario Larch, Michael Pfaffermayr and Janette Walde, Small Sample 
Properties of Maximum Likelihood Versus Generalized Method of Moments Based 
Tests for Spatially Autocorrelated Errors, October 2005 
 
1559 Marie-Laure Breuillé and Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Sharing Budgetary Austerity under Free 
Mobility and Asymmetric Information: An Optimal Regulation Approach to Fiscal 
Federalism, October 2005 
 
1560 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, Subsidizing Enjoyable Education, October 2005 
 
1561 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Non-Linearities in the Relation between the 
Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals, October 2005 
 
1562 Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann, Distribution of Natural Resources, 
Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development: Growth Dynamics with Two Elites, 
October 2005 
 
1563 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Product Market Competition, Investment and 
Employment-Abundant versus Job-Poor Growth: A Real Options Perspective, October 
2005 
 
1564 Kai A. Konrad and Dan Kovenock, Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War, 
October 2005 
 
1565 Joerg Breitung and M. Hashem Pesaran, Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panels, 
October 2005 
 
1566 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, Putting New Economic 
Geography to the Test: Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration in the EU Regions, 
October 2005 
 
1567 Robert Haveman, Karen Holden, Barbara Wolfe and Andrei Romanov, Assessing the 
Maintenance of Savings Sufficiency Over the First Decade of Retirement, October 2005 
 
1568 Hans Fehr and Christian Habermann, Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of 
Progressive Pension Arrangements, October 2005 
 
1569 Jovan Žamac, Pension Design when Fertility Fluctuates: The Role of Capital Mobility 
and Education Financing, October 2005 
 
1570 Piotr Wdowinski and Aneta Zglinska-Pietrzak, The Warsaw Stock Exchange Index 
WIG: Modelling and Forecasting, October 2005 
 
1571 J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Vincenzo Galasso and Paola Profeta, Early Retirement and 
Social Security: A Long Term Perspective, October 2005 
 
 
 
1572 Johannes Binswanger, Risk Management of Pension Systems from the Perspective of 
Loss Aversion, October 2005 
 
1573 Geir B. Asheim, Wolfgang Buchholz, John M. Hartwick, Tapan Mitra and Cees 
Withagen, Constant Savings Rates and Quasi-Arithmetic Population Growth under 
Exhaustible Resource Constraints, October 2005 
 
1574 Christian Hagist, Norbert Klusen, Andreas Plate and Bernd Raffelhueschen, Social 
Health Insurance – the Major Driver of Unsustainable Fiscal Policy?, October 2005 
 
1575 Roland Hodler and Kurt Schmidheiny, How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens 
Progressive Taxes, October 2005 
 
1576 George W. Evans, Seppo Honkapohja and Noah Williams, Generalized Stochastic 
Gradient Learning, October 2005 
 
1577 Torben M. Andersen, Social Security and Longevity, October 2005 
 
1578 Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas, The Market for Protection and the Origin of the 
State, October 2005 
 
1579 Jan K. Brueckner and Stuart S. Rosenthal, Gentrification and Neighborhood Housing 
Cycles: Will America’s Future Downtowns be Rich?, October 2005 
 
1580 Elke J. Jahn and Wolfgang Ochel, Contracting Out Temporary Help Services in 
Germany, November 2005 
 
1581 Astri Muren and Sten Nyberg, Young Liberals and Old Conservatives – Inequality, 
Mobility and Redistribution, November 2005 
 
1582 Volker Nitsch, State Visits and International Trade, November 2005 
 
1583 Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey and Raymond Riezman, Minorities and Storable 
Votes, November 2005 
 
1584 Sascha O. Becker, Introducing Time-to-Educate in a Job Search Model, November 2005 
 
1585 Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager, On the Incentives to Experiment in 
Federations, November 2005 
 
1586 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Guttorm Schjelderup, Centralized 
vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes, November 2005 
 
1587 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Barry Williams, What Determines Differences in Foreign Bank 
Efficiency? Australian Evidence, November 2005 
 
1588 Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk, Transfers, Non-Traded Goods, and 
Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes – Ohlin Debate, November 2005 
